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Abstract
Current societal requirements necessitate the effective delivery of complex projects that
can do more while using less. Yet, recent large-scale project failures suggest that our ability
to successfully deliver them is still at its infancy. Such failures can be seen to arise through
various failure mechanisms; this work focuses on one such mechanism. Specifically, it
examines the likelihood of a project sustaining a large-scale catastrophe, as triggered by
single task failure and delivered via a cascading process. To do so, an analytical model was
developed and tested on an empirical dataset by the means of numerical simulation. This
paper makes three main contributions. First, it provides a methodology to identify the tasks
most capable of impacting a project. In doing so, it is noted that a significant number of
tasks induce no cascades, while a handful are capable of triggering surprisingly large ones.
Secondly, it illustrates that crude task characteristics cannot aid in identifying them,
highlighting the complexity of the underlying process and the utility of this approach. Thirdly,
it draws parallels with systems encountered within the natural sciences by noting the emer-
gence of self-organised criticality, commonly found within natural systems. These findings
strengthen the need to account for structural intricacies of a project’s underlying task prece-
dence structure as they can provide the conditions upon which large-scale catastrophes
materialise.
Introduction
Improved planning and resource allocation is an intricate part of decision making. Within a
project context, task decomposition and dependency mapping are usual ways of improving it.
Standard practice for doing so, for modelling any kind of project, relies on the use of task prece-
dence data [1]. Currently, the majority of tools adopt an activity-on-arc network representation
[2], building on concepts first introduced by the Critical Path Method [3] and Program Evalua-
tion and Review Technique [4]. This view is formally constructed using temporal elements of
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the project (e.g. task duration as the length of the arc). As such, the main emphasis is on the
temporal aspects of Project Management (PM) e.g. improving the estimation of the project’s
overall duration, while acknowledging the uncertain duration of its composing tasks [2, 5–7].
Approaches of this sort do not focus on the non-trivial topology of the underlying precedence
network. As a consequence, a number of fundamental deficiencies arises–Williams [8] catego-
rises them as follows:
• Feedback loops: Consider a task that is conditional on some sort of quality test. Failure to
comply will immediately lead to the task being repeated. Though important, our work will
not focus on this aspect;
• Non-linear relationships: Cause and effect are not necessarily proportionate;
• Emergent behaviours: Complete predictability of the behaviour of a system at one scale does
not necessarily imply complete predictability of the system at a different scale.
Emergence is a fundamental property of complex systems [9, 10]—understanding its impact
on systemic performance is of great interest as undesirable, systemic effects (e.g. global catas-
trophe fuelled by local failures) have been linked to the loss of billions of USD and, in some
cases, human life [11–13]. Managing these systemic effects has been a challenging task across
numerous diverse fields, ranging from epidemiology [14–17] and finance [18, 19] to infrastruc-
ture management [20, 21]. Despite the contextual differences of these domains, the underlying
approach for understanding these systemic effects tends to be similar. Specifically, mathemati-
cal models are used to define the process that drives these systemic effects, and numerical simu-
lation to assess its validity and practical relevance [22]. Complex networks have proved to be a
highly successful framework in sustaining this approach, adequately capturing the intricacies
(in the form of non-linear interactions) that underlie the structure of these systems [23–26].
Under this view, such catastrophes are seen as the emergent outcome of a sequential progres-
sion of failures (or a cascade) as they propagate throughout the system’s structure (or network)
[22, 26]. One way of modelling these cascades is through the use of a threshold model, first
introduced in [27] to explain social segregation. Variants of this model have been subsequently
applied to a wide range of contexts, ranging from social contagion [15, 28] and disease propa-
gation [14, 16, 17] to systemic risk [19, 29, 30] suggesting its capacity to serve as a unifying
framework for modelling similar systemic effects [18].
By adopting a similar approach, the likelihood of a project sustaining large scale catastro-
phes, as triggered by local failures, can be assessed. Though insight of this sort may uncover
numerous interesting statistical properties of the system [26], they are of little practical use to a
project manager. This incompatibility arises from the nature of control that a project manager
can exert on the system i.e. he/she can only manage the task(s) that are currently active. In
other words, global information, such as statistical descriptions, is of little practical use if the
project manager is limited to local action [31]. As such, the industry is slowly transitioning
from the once-ubiquitous notion of a critical path (global information) to individual measures
of task criticality (local information) [32]. In the context of cascading failures, such local infor-
mation revolves around identifying the nodes responsible for their emergence, forming the
main research question:
Can we quantitatively assess the likely impact that a single, local failure in a project will have
at a global level?
To evaluate the research question, an analytical model is devised and subsequently tested on
an empirical dataset using numerical simulation. Typically, means of this sort tend be both
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time consuming and resource intensive. This is in contrast with regular decisions making,
which takes place within the restrictions of limited budget and stringent timeframes. To reflect
this reality, the capacity of task information to serve as proxies for identifying these critical
tasks will also be explored.
This work makes three contributions. Firstly, proposes a model that can replicate a cascad-
ing process across any type of project while using widely-captured and readily-available data.
Similar approaches have been used to explore the robustness of numerous complex systems
[26], yet project robustness has eluded a similar treatment—this work aims to fill this gap. By
doing so, the capacity of each task to trigger a catastrophe can be quantitatively assessed.
Importantly, this work highlights that both local and global failures can arise from the exact
same mechanism–insights of this sort are in agreement with similar observations from numer-
ous other systems [33]. Secondly, this work shows that simple task information is incapable of
serving as a proxy for identifying these critical tasks–further analysis shows similar inefficien-
cies in using network-based centrality measures (i.e. degree, betweenness). Thirdly, it provides
analogies between project behaviour and natural systems, hinting a link with a theory describ-
ing the behaviour of the latter. By doing so, it hints that general theories with wide (or even uni-
versal) project applicability may be possible. This is a widely sought but currently eluding
quality for management science [34] as project uniqueness is deeply engrained within the liter-
ature [1], and contradicts the very ethos of a project-focused theory.
The remaining part of the paper will be structured as follows: the Data section will introduce
the dataset used. The Model section will briefly introduce the concept of the model, followed
by formal definitions of its key components, along with the algorithm used to deliver the
dynamic. The Result section contains the initial configuration of the model and the subsequent
results of the analysis. A Discussion section will provide the interpretation of the results, fol-
lowed by a Conclusion section. Supplementary Information provides further supporting evi-
dence for this work, including the raw file (and derived dataset) used, a worked example of the
algorithm and further results.
Data
Engineering projects with a focus on technical activities form a representative class of modern
organisation activity [34]—construction projects being a subset of them. As such, empirical
task precedence information (in the form of a Gantt chart) of a construction project were
obtained and used to construct an activity-on-node (AON) network. The aim of the project
was to deliver a Commercial Office complex, over a period of 743 days (September 2004 to Sep-
tember 2006) with an agreed cost of approximately 13 million USD. The Gantt chart was last
modified 603 days after the project was started.
Under an activity-on-node (AON) network, a project is abstracted as a directed graph G =
{{N} {E}}, in which every task i is abstracted as node i, i 2 N. Similarly, a dependency between
task i and j is mapped using a directed link (or edge) ei,j, where ei,j 2 E. It is worth noting that
an AON network provides for a more general and flexible approach when compared to the tra-
ditional activity-on-arc network view, adequately capturing structural intricacies of the task
precedence information [35, 36]. The start and end date of task i is noted as T starti and T
end
i
respectively–see Fig 1 for a trivial example; Fig 2 for the actual AON network used, composed
of 833 nodes and 806 edges. The original Gantt chart is provides in S1 Dataset; the resulting
AON network in S1 Table; details of individual tasks are included in S2 Table; an overview of
the method from converting a Gantt chart to the AON network can be found in S1 Text.
It should be noted that AON networks have a rather distinct character from other forms of
networks, both in terms of topological features and the level of information that they capture.
Complex Networks and Project Systemic Risk
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In terms of their topology, AON network are composed of distinct concentrations of 3-node
subgraphs (or structural motifs [37]), distinguishing them from other natural and engineered
systems [38]. In terms of information captured, AON networks include both global (i.e. topo-
logical features) and local information (i.e. task duration); along with an interpretation on the
Euclidean space of a network (i.e. length of a link corresponds to the time between two conse-
cutive tasks). The latter feature is reminiscent of spatial networks (where length of a link corre-
sponds to physical distance). Yet, a number of assumptions that underlies spatial networks
(e.g. link preservation comes at a cost [39], loops are allowed [40]) limits their commonalities.
Similarly, synthetic networks, constructed using some form of generative process (e.g. prefer-
ential attachment [41], rewiring [42]), have few commonalities with AON networks. Specifi-
cally, such networks restrict themselves in replicating specific statistical features of a network’s
topology (e.g. heavy-tail degree distribution; high clustering with low average path length).
Though extremely useful, such models are bound to miss important information (i.e. task
duration; time between consecutives tasks) whilst ignore various restrictions (i.e. absence of
loops). We thus consider the construction of a generative mechanism that can capture all vital
information whilst satisfying some distinct topological features to be an open challenge.
Model
Overview
The failure of an individual node can be described by considering a tipping point, where the
state of a node changes if a threshold value is exceeded. Such a threshold value may be inter-
preted as the capacity of a node to operate and hence, must capture relevant contextual infor-
mation. In the context of projects, one such quantity is the quality of completion of task i. The
impact of task i failing can be explored numerically by artificially failing it (i.e. switch its state
from “non-affected” to “affected”) and examining its capacity to affect its neighbouring task(s)
Fig 1. AON network abstraction. Example project illustrating the network view adopted throughout this work.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g001
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Fig 2. AON network of the empirical dataset. Each node corresponds to a task; each directed link to a precedence relationship. Node size corresponds to
task duration; node colour and position corresponds to a task’s start data, relative to the start of the project (e.g. darker and further away from centre indicates
a task which started at a later stage).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g002
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j—these tasks are considered to be stressed. The amount of stress that they receive is a function
of node’s j individual characteristics that can affect its exposure to this stress (i.e. its “sensitiv-
ity”), along with the efficiency at which the failure of task i is being conveyed (i.e. its “spreading
power”). As a result of the combination of these intrinsic and extrinsic influences, the threshold
of task j decreases. In relative terms, if this change is greater than a given percentage of its origi-
nal threshold, task j fails and now has the opportunity to fuel the cascade further by affecting
its own neighbours. Once the cascade process has been brought to an end (i.e. task i has no
neighbours; neighbouring task(s) have resisted failure), the effect is recorded and the state of all
tasks is reset to “non-affected”–this process is iterated across all tasks.
Intrinsic Nodal Characteristics
Links found within the AON network can be seen as functional dependences, where the start
of task j is conditional to the successful delivery of all of its predecessors (i.e. task i). Conse-
quently, the quality of completion of task i (qi) will inevitably influence the potential quality of
task j i.e. the higher the former, the more probable the successful (i.e. high quality) delivery of
the latter. Quality is a function of numerous parameters, one of them being the ability to dis-
pense resources (e.g. time, material, labour, equipment etc.) as originally planned. Conse-
quently, the ratio between the time resource, measured in days, assigned for completing task
i ðTplani Þ against the one actually delivered ðTactuali Þ, deﬁned as bTi ¼ TactualiTplani , can be used as an input
for obtaining qi. The term Tactuali acknowledges the uncertain nature of the environment in
which the project takes place. It is deﬁned as
Tactuali ¼
Tplani þ bpdfi ; if Tplani þ bpdfi > 0
1 otherwise
ð1Þ
(
where bpdfi serves as a perturbation term, effectively accounting for this uncertainty. Note that a
conditional deﬁnition is required in order to avoid possible negative Tactuali values (e.g. when
bpdfi is negative and greater than T
plan
i ). For each task i, an ensemble of 1,000 b
pdf
i values is
drawn from a given probability density function (pdf), see Fig 3, before suitably aggregated to a
single value per task. Speciﬁcally, the 95th percentile value of the ensemble of 1,000 bpdfi values
is used to derive a worst-case scenario for every Tactuali . Clearly, the nature of the pdf will dictate
both the variance and size of obtainable bpdfi values, reﬂecting a relatively uncertain or stable
environment. Within this work, the latter is simulated via the use of a Normal pdf i.e.
bpdfi  N ð0; 2Þ. We note that the inﬂuence of bTi is restricted in describing the initial quality of
task i, deﬁning its tipping point (see Eq 11). As such, the quality of completion of each task (as
a function of bTi ), its spreading power and sensitivity provide an initial description for each task
i, but do not interfere with the dynamics of the cascade mechanism.
Although it may not be practical to account for the exact relationship between time and
quality for every task i, some of its attributes can be specified as:
1. Quality increases monotonically as the cumulative resource that drives it ðbTi Þ also increases.
2. If the task receives exactly its planned resource (i.e. bTi ¼ 1), it will achieve an almost perfect
quality of completion i.e. q(1) = 0.995. This is because its quality can always increase (even
by an infinitesimally small increment) if the resource expenditure also increases.
3. A task will have a quality of zero unless some resource has been spent i.e. q(0) = 0.
Complex Networks and Project Systemic Risk
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Three distinct functions have been specified—a linear, sigmoidal and exponential relation-
ship–see Fig 4 (see S2 Text for mathematical definitions). Each of these quality functions (QF)
captures a number of distinct features. For example, the sigmoidal function (informally knows
as the “s-curve”) captures the law of diminishing returns i.e. the closer you reach to your target,
the greater the resource expenditure required, a behaviour regularly used to describe numerous
process within the domain of PM [1].
Extrinsic Nodal Characteristics
A number of key network properties are expected to significantly affect the way in which the
cascading process unravels. Network structure has been shown to be one such aspect [14, 43–
45]; temporal features being another [46–48]. As a consequence, some nodes will have an
increased capacity to fuel such cascades i.e. have an increased spreading power ðCSPi Þ. At the
same time, others are expected to be increasingly sensitive ðCSi Þ in being affected by such cas-
cades. Consequently, and within this section, both CSPðmÞi and C
SðmÞ
i will be formally deﬁned by
using topological and temporal aspects of the AON network—m will denote each aspect used,
wherem = {topo, temp, slack}—see Table 1.
Spreading Power for task i. The fundamental condition for enabling a cascading process
is the existence of at least one link between node i and j. However, there may be a number of
paths in which node i can reach node j—the greater the number of paths, the more likely it is
for node i affect node j. Importantly, not all paths can be deemed to be of the same importance
—longer paths play a lesser role as they are less likely to be traversed [49]. As such, the number
of hops needed for node i to reach node j can be used as weighting for each such path. In other
words, the greater the number of hops required for node i to reach node j, the lower the contri-
bution of that path will be, in terms of a nodes’ spreading power. By summing the number of
Fig 3. Example pdfs fromwhich bpdfi ensembles may be drawn from.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g003
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these weighted paths, a measure of effectiveness in terms of pairwise interactions can be
defined i.e. how effective node i can reach node j, over all possible paths [50, 51]. Let us refer to
this quantity as the Pairwise Embeddedness Coefficient (PEC) between node i and j. This quan-
tity can be computed by using the so-called adjacency matrix, defined as:
Aði; jÞ ¼ 1 if there is a link between i and j
0 otherwise
(
A fundamental property of the adjacency matrix is that as it is raised in power k, the entry
Ak(i, j) will provide the total number of paths between i and j of length k. This operation can be
Fig 4. Quality function (QF), showing the relationship between time and completed quality. From left to right, the Linear, Sigmoidal and Exponential
QF.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g004
Table 1. Overview of extrinsic nodal characteristics.
Spreading Power, CSPi Sensitivity, C
S
i
Topological
Aspects
CSPðtopoÞi —based on the number of ways
node i can reach node j, weighted over the
distance that it has to traverse (Eq 3).
CSðtopoÞj —based on the number of
predecessors node j has (Eq 7)
Temporal
Aspects
CSPðtempÞi —A ratio between the duration of
node i in relation to the overall duration of
the project (Eq 4).
CSðtempÞj —The inverse ratio between the
overall project duration and the duration of
node j (Eq 8).
CSðslackÞj —based on the slack time between
node i and j (Eq 9).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.t001
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used to compute PEC between node i and j:
Pairwise Embeddedness Coefficient; PECi;j ¼
Xn
k¼1
Akði; jÞ
k
ð2Þ
where n is the total number of nodes, k is the length of the path between i and j. As a trivial
example, consider Fig 5. One could argue that nodem, i and k have equal inﬂuence on
node j, and this may be so. However, it is clear that node i can inﬂuence node j directly but
also indirectly through node k. Consequently, node i has a stronger pairwise interaction (i.e.
PECi,j> PECm,j = PECk,j) a direct result of its increased network embeddedness.
Consequently, if node i has a high PEC value with respect to an increased number of nodes,
it implies that it is well embedded within the network and thus, well positioned to affect a great
number of nodes. This quantity can be calculated by summing PECi,j over all reachable nodes j:
CSPðtopoÞi ¼
X
i 6¼jPECi;j ¼
X
i 6¼j
Xn
k¼1
Akði; jÞ
k
ð3Þ
In terms of the temporal aspect of CSPi , task duration is deemed to be of relevance. Speciﬁ-
cally, and in the context of PM, the capacity of a task to inﬂuence its succeeding task is expected
Fig 5. Trivial AON network illustrating the relevance of PEC in the context of a cascading process.
Node i can affect node j directly, and indirectly, through node k. As such, it has an increased influence on
node j, a result of increased network embeddedness, reflected by a high PEC value.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g005
Complex Networks and Project Systemic Risk
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to be a function of how much time the latter is expected to consume, over the entire project
duration. The greater this quantity is the greater the inﬂuence of the task upon its successors–
in other words:
CSPðtempÞi ¼
T endi  T starti
T endN  T start1
ð4Þ
where task index 1 and N represent the ﬁrst and last task of the project respectively. Note that
the overall spreading power is necessarily zero if any of its two constituent aspects is also zero
i.e. a task with a given duration and/or out-degree of zero. It can be deﬁned as:
CSPi ¼ CSPðtopoÞi  CSPðtempÞi ð5Þ
Note that since q(i) 2 [0, 1], CSPi also needs to be normalised within that range:
C
0
i
SP ¼ C
SP
i minCSP
maxCSP minCSP where C
0
i SP 2 ½0; 1 ð6Þ
Failure Sensitivity for task j. As links represent functional dependencies, by increasing
the number of predecessor tasks to any given task, an increase in the probability of failure is to
be expected—there are simply more things that can go wrong. This topological aspect can be
introduced by accounting for the in-degree of node j:
CSðtopoÞj ¼ kinj ¼
Xn
i¼1Aði; jÞ ð7Þ
The temporal aspect of a task’s sensitivity will be a function of two distinct aspects–tasks
duration ðCSðtempÞj Þ and the time between the delivery of task i and the initiation of task
j ðCSðslackÞj Þ. It is worth noting that although the latter is traditionally used within PM practice
(i.e. task free ﬂoat [52]), it has been shown to affect the operation of various other complex sys-
tems [53–56].
Focusing on the influence of task duration, the exact opposite effect of the one introduced in
CSPðtempÞi is to be expected. Consider the trivial example shown in Fig 6 –in which the duration
of Task B is varied. If a risk materializes during the undertaking of Task A, Case I is ill prepared
to cope against it, compared with Case II. This is because Task B has a smaller capacity (i.e.
duration) to absorb this external shock and hence, have a reduced ability to add extra working
hours to mitigate against it. In other words, a shorter task is expected to be increasingly prone
to change as the opportunity to increase working hours within the actual time allocated for it,
Fig 6. Example of two task sequences (Case I and II) with same overall duration but different individual duration. Under Case I, task B has a smaller
duration than its counterpart in Case II. Consequently, the inter-event time between task A and B is larger in Case I than its counterpart in Case II.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g006
Complex Networks and Project Systemic Risk
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469 November 25, 2015 10 / 21
are less. Mathematically, it can be deﬁned as:
CSðtempÞj ¼
TendN  T start1
Tendj  T startj
ð8Þ
With respect to the time between two consequent tasks, and its effect on node sensitivity,
consider Fig 6 in which T startB  TendA , under Case I, is greater than the one in Case II. With
respect to Task B, if Task A experiences a failure, Case II is arguably a worse scenario than Case
I (assuming all other factors remain constants) as there is less time to react before Task B
begins.
To quantify this effect, a similar approach as the one used for computing CSPðtopoÞi is used, in
which the number of hops between nodes is simply replaced by the time difference between
two consequent tasks. Note that CSðtempÞj is bound to scale with k
in
j , though this does not neces-
sarily imply that node’s j sensitivity has increased, from a temporal point of view. It is rather an
artefact induced by node’s j topology—this effect can be eliminated by normalising the sum
with the in-degree of node j:
CSðslackÞj ¼
TendN  T start1
max 1; 1
kin
j
P
i2IðTendi  T startj Þ
  ð9Þ
where kinj ¼
Pn
i¼1Aði; jÞ; I is the set of nodes that directly connects to j i.e. A(i, j) = 1 and the
max function ensures that CSðslackÞj has a lower bound.
The overall sensitivity of task j is expected to be zero if either of CSðtopoÞj ; C
SðtempÞ
j or C
SðslackÞ
j are
zero. Hence, a combined metric CSj is deﬁned:
CSj ¼ CSðtopoÞj  CSðtempÞj  CSðslackÞj ð10Þ
As with CSPi , C
S
j is also normalised in a similar fashion, obtaining C
0
j
S 2 ½0; 1. Finally, note
that all three metric, and therefore the result metric CSj , are unitless.
Cascade Process
A threshold value lies at the core of the cascade process, serving as the tipping point of failure
propagation—it can be interpreted as the capacity of node i to perform. Consequently, it needs
to account for essential contextual information. As such, every node j is assigned an initial fail-
ure threshold, based on its quality of completion (Eq 11, second term on RHS). Subsequently,
every node i is artificially failed (i.e. its state is switched from “non-affected” to “affected”) and
the state of all of its neighbouring nodes j is assessed. The amount of stress that they receive
will be a function of their own sensitivity ðC0 jSÞ, along with the efﬁciency at which node i can
convey this stress i.e. its spreading power ðC0 iSPÞ—as captured by the ﬁrst and second term in
the LHS of Eq 11 respectively. If the magnitude of this stress is greater than a given percentage
of its initial capacity, then node j fails is considered and has the opportunity to fuel the cascade
further by affecting its own neighbours. Note that the state of every node j is deﬁned as sj 2
[0, 1], corresponding to “non-affected” or “affected” respectively. Finally, parameter α provides
the means of devising a spectrum of conditions, where the magnitude of the failure threshold
can be controlled–it does so by acting as a scaling factor. Consequently, the higher α is, the
Complex Networks and Project Systemic Risk
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harder it is for node j to be affected. Naturally, the largest cascade is expected to be observed at
α = 0 while the smallest one should arise at α = 200.
The following description details the algorithm that delivers the dynamics (see S3 Text, and
S1 Fig, for a worked example):
Cascade Model Algorithm
1. Model parameterisation:
- Set model parameter: α 2 [1, 200]
- Define a quality function: QF.
- Define which node is artificially failed at the start of the simulation: k
2. Model initialisation:
- Draw task fluctuations bpdfi from a statistical distribution.
- Set qi ¼ QF

Tplani þ bpdfi

=

Tplani
 
for all i
- Define initial node states at time t=0: sið0Þ ¼
1; if i ¼¼ k
0; otherwise
(
3. Model dynamics:
- Iterate simulated time t=1, 2, . . ., until no more change happens:
- For all ‘affected’ nodes i (i.e. nodes where si = = 1):
- For all successor nodes j of node i:
sjðtÞ ¼
1; if CSj þ CSPi 
a
100
 qj
sjðt  1Þ; otherwise
ð11Þ
8<:
4. Model outcome:
- The number of affected nodes: 1
n
Pn
i¼1 si
The condition controlling the dynamics (Eq 11) is driven by the magnitude of change expe-
rienced by each task. As such, it suggests that an activity has a given capacity to tolerate fluctua-
tions when things do not go as planned, in terms of resource allocation. This view differs from
typical cascade models, where the state of a node changes according to an absolute threshold
value (either drawn from empirical estimates, e.g. [57], or purely arbitrary values e.g. [45]). In
the case of projects, the application of absolute thresholds will not apply due to the inherently
large variation in the nature of tasks, where no absolute value can provide for a sensible thresh-
old for all possible types of tasks. In response, Eq 11 introduces a relative threshold, shifting the
condition of failure to the magnitude of the relative change rather than an absolute value. By
doing so, it assumes that tasks will not necessarily affect their successors in light of their own
poor quality, but rather on their inability to cope with large changes. In other words, it is more
likely for a poorly completed task to still be delivered, unlocking its successors, when compared
to one that has a relatively higher level of quality but has sustained extensive changes.
Results
Initial Setup
This model has three main parameters that can be controlled–the pdf of which bpdfi is drawn
from (Fig 2); the QF used to deﬁne the relationship between resource and quality (Fig 3) and
control parameter α. The ﬁrst captures the volatility of the environment in which the project
takes place; the second relates to the nature of the task itself; the third provides a global variable
that increases the difﬁculty of which a cascade can progress. In step with the scope of this
work, only the latter will be varied–both the pdf and QF used will be set as constants. Speciﬁ-
cally, the pdf will be set to Normal, representing a stable environment in which the probability
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of obtaining increasingly large bpdfi values decreases exponentially. With respect to used QF,
the Sigmoidal variant will be chosen due to its widespread use in describing various PM activi-
ties; the entire set of results can be found in S3 Table. Nevertheless, and for the sake of com-
pleteness, results of the Linear and Exponential QF are also included–see S2 Fig
After this initial setup, node i, 8i 2 N, is forced to fail and its impact captured by enumerat-
ing the size of the triggered cascade—this process is repeated across a range of α values, 8α 2
[0, 200]. It is worth noting that the mere observation of any significant cascades, under this set-
up, highlights the fact that no great exogenous factor is required for global catastrophes to
occur. In other words, the role of the environment in the emergence of cascades is minimal,
limited to simply triggering a single, local failure. Once this local impact has been registered,
the mechanism responsible for driving the cascade is entirely self-contained, emphasizing the
importance of the underlying AON network.
Model Output
Interestingly, a large percentage of nodes are incapable of inducing any form of cascade–this is
clearly marked by the abundance of blue hue at α = 0—see Fig 7A. Naturally, this percentage
increases as α also increases. In the domain of α 2 [0,ﬃ 50], the capacity of the nodes to induce
any given cascade shows no change, noted by the constant gradient across all colours. In other
words, the impact of having no resistance to failure (the direct result of setting α = 0) continues
up to αﬃ 50 (Fig 7A, blue hue). At this point, the size of the maximum cascade is 446 –see Fig
7B. As α continues to increase, cascade sizes drop, with the rate of decrease in size growing sig-
nificantly once α grows above approximately 75. Interestingly, the rate of decrease appears to
be proportional to the maximum impact of each node i.e. large cascades diminish faster than
Fig 7. Model results. a) Size of cascade (colour, log scale) as each node i (y-axis) is purposefully failed across a range of α, 8α 2 [0, 200] (x-axis). b)
Captures the aggregated state in which the maximum/mean cascade size is mapped (y-axis) across the entire spectrum of α (x-axis). Finally, c) captures the
cumulative probability distribution of cascade sizes, at α = 0. Note the log-log scale used.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g007
Complex Networks and Project Systemic Risk
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469 November 25, 2015 13 / 21
smaller ones. Once α reaches 100, the maximum cascade size stabilises to 29, and remains rela-
tively constant, despite occasional reductions which result to a final maximum cascade size of
13, at α = 200—see Fig 7B.
It should be noted that the difference between the largest and the average cascade is substan-
tial, and remains so across all α, ranging from 5.10 and up to 13.21 standard deviations. Clearly,
such variance would not be possible under a Gaussian distribution (or any other function with
an exponential tail). Consider Fig 7C, as it presents the cumulative probability distribution of
all obtained cascade sizes, averaged across α. The obtained straight line under a log-log plot
highlights that the distribution resembles a power law, in which f(x)*xε where ε is the scaling
exponent–in this case ε = 1.57. Since ε< 2, the distribution has a theoretically infinite mean
and variance; in reality it is bound to be capped by the finite size of the system. In other words,
the size of the largest possible cascades is capped by the number of nodes that can be reached
by any single node. Analogous behaviour has been observed in numerous other interactive sys-
tems and has been linked to the emergence of complexity–see Section 4 for a discussion on its
implications in the context of PM.
Task Characteristics as Proxies
Seeking to rank tasks based on the cascade size triggered by their failure poses a methodological
question–are extensive simulations necessary or could task characteristics serve as proxies?
Importantly, these task characteristics need to be widely captured and easily identified via stan-
dard practice–task duration; count of task successors and start date are used and assessed
within this sub-section.
With respect to task duration (Fig 8A), it is clear that the majority of long-duration tasks
occur mid-point of the project–however those tasks are not necessarily the ones that cause the
greatest cascades. In fact, the two most critical tasks (Task 350 and 351) have duration of 3 and
4 days respectively (compared to the maximum task duration of 286 days), yet their failure can
affect a total of 446 and 444 tasks respectively (Table 2). On the other hand, failure of the two
longest tasks (Task 719 and 199) will affect a total of 2 and 17 tasks respectively, having a sig-
nificantly smaller impact. Similar trends are noted throughout the entirety of nodes–see
Fig 8. Task Characteristics as proxies for capacity of task to trigger cascades, under α = 0. Tasks are mapped according to their start date (x-axis) and
in terms of the impact that their failure will have, in terms of cascade size (y-axis). In a) task duration (node size and colour) is assessed as a potential proxy;
in b) the out-degree. c) Tasks capable of affecting at least 25% of the total number of tasks are shown (red); at least 10% are also shown (green).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g008
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Table 2 for an example on the 5 top impacting (left section) and longest tasks (right section)
respectively. In terms of the successors of each task, this can be quantified as the node’s out-
degree–see Fig 8B. In terms of number of successors and cascade size, no significant correlation
has also been noted–see Fig 8B. As an example, consider Task 3 and 42, with 10 and 8 succes-
sors tasks respectively (two highest ranking)–their failure will impact 40 and 14 tasks respec-
tively. Interestingly, this low correlation between node out-degree and failure cascade size also
extends to node betweenness. Specifically, the Pearson Correlation coefficient between cascade
sizes and node between is 0.6370 (p-value<0.0001). For reference, the Pearson Correlation
coefficient between out-degree and failure cascade sizes is 0.3359 (p-value<0.0001).
Finally, note that the entirety of nodes that can significantly impact the project is scheduled
at the 1st half of the project. Specifically, tasks that significantly impact the project (i.e. affect at
least 25% of all tasks) take place at the early stages of the project, being limited to the 1st quarter
of the project’s duration. The same applies for tasks capable of affecting at least 10% of all
tasks, though they are spread more evenly throughout the 1st half of the project–see Fig 8C.
Discussion
This work is based upon a self-contained model that captures the emergence of large catastro-
phes (i.e. no external input is required to sustain the cascading process). By doing so, a number
of important insights can be drawn. Firstly, it suggests that large catastrophes do not necessary
require a great exogenous force to emerge–in fact, a single local failure can be sufficient in tak-
ing out a large portion of the project. This is of great practical relevance as it challenges a key
aspect of project management–the impact assessment of a risk, in an a priory fashion [1, 58].
As such, the effectiveness and efficiency of the subsequent mitigation action may be mis-
matched, resulting in an escalation of failures or unnecessary resource expenditure. Quantify-
ing this aspect, along with tracing it back to the tasks responsible for it, enables proactive
project (and risk) management, striving for increased project robustness. In response, Fig 7A
captures this aspect at a global level, summarising the cascade size induced by failing each node
i. Equally, Fig 9A and 9B provides a visual example of two nodes of which their failure can
induce the largest and an average cascade respectively. Such means of analysis enable project
managers to quantitatively and objectively assess the criticality of each task and prioritise
resource allocation and mitigation planning accordingly. Equally, one could aggregate the criti-
cality of all tasks and devise a high-level profile (e.g. Fig 7), enabling project-level comparisons
within a portfolio. By doing so, projects capable of sustaining larger cascades, assuming a local
failure does indeed occur, can be identified and managed accordingly. It is worth noting that
the majority of tasks has a limited capacity of triggering a cascade–in fact 391 tasks induce no
Table 2. Task characteristics for the 5 highest ranking tasks, in terms of cascade size (a) and task duration (b).
a) Tasks, ranked based on
cascade size
Cascade
Size
Task
Duration
Task Start
Date
b) Tasks, ranked based on
task duration
Task
Duration
Cascade
Size
Task Start
Date
1st Task 446 3 +70 1st Task 286 2 +285
2nd Task 444 4 +75 2nd Task 234 17 +159
3rd Task 235 3 +79 3rd Task 186 7 +264
4th Task 234 1 +84 4th Task 170 5 +488
5th Task 231 12 +117 5th Task 169 6 +390
a) Top 5 tasks, ranked on the maximum cascade size they can trigger, along with their respective proxies such as task duration and their start date
relative to the start of the project
b) Top 5 tasks, ranked on their task duration, along with the maximum cascade size they can trigger and their start date.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.t002
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cascade, with an average cascade of 17.29 at the worst case scenario (i.e. when α = 0). Hence, it
is rather surprising that the maximum cascade deviates from the mean to such a great extent
(nearly 10 standard deviations). Evidence of this sort highlight the extreme asymmetry in the
capacity of tasks to impact the project, emphasizing that no single management approach can
be applied to all of them. Some tasks are distinctly different in terms of their capacity to impact
the project and should be treated as such.
By acknowledging this asymmetry, it is worth exploring whether crude task characteristics
can provide hints of task capacity, or whether simulation-based approaches, as the one
described within this work, are necessary. Trivially, one would expect that tasks scheduled at
the early stages of the project would be more critical as they have a larger pool of potential
tasks to affect. With reference to Fig 8C–this is indeed the case, evident by the far left location
of all red (and some green) nodes on the x-axis. However, a number of influential tasks (i.e.
remaining green nodes) can also be seen at the latter stage of the project. In a PM context, this
implies that even if tasks are performing well at the initial stages of a project, this observation
cannot serve as a predictive proxy of future project performance, as some tasks that are yet
to be completed still have the capacity to affect a relatively large percentage of all tasks
(greater than 10%). With respect to Fig 8A and 8B, it is clear than neither the number of task
successors nor the duration can adequately serve as proxies for the even qualitatively assessing
task criticality. In fact, further analysis indicates that another widely used metric (node
betweenness) perform poorly in predicting the influence of all tasks, with respect to the size of
a failure cascade that they can induce. This view is in line with the critical work of Lawyer [59],
where he argues that the utility of such metrics in limited due to their lack of accuracy. None-
theless, adopting a network perspective does provide some intuitive insight over traditional
approaches–see Fig 9. Specifically, the task responsible for the largest cascade (Fig 9A) appears
Fig 9. Visual example on the progression of the largest and average cascade, under α = 0. a) The source of the largest noted cascade (red), along with
the subsequently failed nodes (blue). b) Same as a), but capturing a typical cascade.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469.g009
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to be well embedded within the system. In contrast, a task capable of triggering an average cas-
cade (Fig 9B) appears to be on the outskirts of the structure. Project managers can use this
insight in order to quickly identify potential candidate tasks that may be critical while avoiding
extensive simulation. Nevertheless, it is clear that if increased precision and rigor are required,
approaches like the one described within this work have a lot to offer.
From a practical perspective, increasing the resilience of a project is bound to be a challeng-
ing task, due to limitations in amending the underlying network structure. Specifically, as links
represent functional interdependences between tasks, it is hard to rewire them without impos-
ing significant changes on a project’s outcome. One way of getting around this limitation is to
decouple the successor tasks of critical tasks by assigning them to different contractor(s). By
doing so, the failure of a critical task will have a limited impact on its subsequent tasks, assum-
ing the operation of such contractors is independent. Influencing temporal aspects of a project
can further increase the resilience of a project. Preliminary work indicates that by changing the
IET distribution from being heavily-skewed to a normal one (in effect, minimising the vari-
ance) improves the resilience of the entire project–this insight is consistent with results
reported in [47]. As such, projects described by temporal homogeneity are expected to be more
robust. Nonetheless, further work is needed to develop means of overcoming various restric-
tions (e.g. resource availability, cash-flow) before being able to change the IET of all tasks.
On a wider scope, this work also draws certain analogies between projects and natural sys-
tems. Specifically, the fact that small failures can have an extensive impact on the overall sys-
tem, along with the noted power law that describes the cascade size distribution, have been
noted in numerous other domains, ranging from geology to economics. Self-Organised Criti-
cality (SOC) is a general theory, first proposed by Bak, Tang [60], and has formed the basis of
devising general principles around the emergence of complexity within those systems. Such
generality is mostly absent from management science as the widely-voiced proposition of each
project being unique fosters the development of case-specific knowledge. Hence, by highlight-
ing aspects of SOC within projects, parallels can be drawn within the theory that describes the
behaviour of these natural systems. By doing so, one could envision the emergence of wider
principles that can be applied to an increased number of projects, contradicting the very notion
of a project being a “unique endeavour” but rather being a system of which its complexity
could equally be compared with other natural systems.
Unfortunately, the distinct character of the AON networks (compared to other widely used
synthetic networks) poses a significant restriction on testing the universality of the results pre-
sented herein. As such, further exploration of the analogy between project behaviour (and the
ability to construct a widely applicable theory) and natural systems are a challenging task, as
empirical data remains the sole source of AON networks. Working towards clarifying this
aspect, the authors have been involved in a larger study (involving a total of 8 AON networks)
where qualitative similar results were obtained (draft manuscript available upon request). Con-
sequently, the capacity of projects to sustain disproportionately large cascading failures, along
with the challenged notion project uniqueness (and the subsequent implications on wider-proj-
ect theory) is not outlier behaviour but rather a wider phenomenon worth further exploration
due to its important practical implications.
Conclusion
A project can be seen as a large interactive system [38, 61] in which complexity emerges at a
number of dimensions [8, 62]. As a direct result of this complexity, a number of great failures
have recently been noted [11–13]. This work focuses on a specific failure mode that is enabled
by such structural complexity [62]–the capacity of a local failure to emerge as a global
Complex Networks and Project Systemic Risk
PLOS ONE | DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0142469 November 25, 2015 17 / 21
catastrophe via a cascading process [18, 19]. To do so, a set of mechanisms were constructed,
based on a general model (i.e. the threshold model) that was suitably modified to reflect context
specific aspects such as quality of task completion. This process was modelled against an
empirical AON network.
In doing so, nodes that had a capacity to induce disproportionately large cascades were
identified, along with illustrating the fact that a great number of nodes were incapable of spark-
ing any cascades (Fig 7A and 7B). Similarly, it was shown that crude, project management ori-
entated information such as task duration, number of successors and task start date provide no
significant insight in terms of the task capacity to trigger a cascade (Fig 8)–similar insufficien-
cies were under various network-based metrics such as node degree and node betweenness.
Hence, analysis of this sort is of significant practical utility as it provides important, practical
information while using a widely used data-structure. By doing so, a number of proactive risk
mitigation techniques can be applied by decision makers (e.g. decoupling critical tasks, narrow-
ing the variance of the IET distribution) in order to improve the robustness of a project. Finally,
parallels with SOC, as encountered in numerous natural systems, were drawn (e.g. Fig 8C), sug-
gesting commonalities between projects and other complex systems. If that is indeed the case,
then here lies an opportunity for transitioning from a case-by-case understanding to develop-
ing general principles for project management. This is a widely sought but currently eluding
quality of management science, reflecting the generally voiced opinion that every project is
unique—such evidence highlights that the contrary may also be true.
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